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Free to Squander? Democracy, Institutional Design, and 
Economic Sustainability, 1975–2000 
 
Abstract: 
While democracy’s effect on economic growth has come under intense empirical scrutiny, its effect on 
economic sustainability has been noticeably neglected. We assess the effects of regime type and 
democratic institutional design on economic, or “weak” sustainability. Sustainability requires that 
stocks of capital do not depreciate in value over time. The World Bank gauges the rate of net 
investment in manufactured, human, and natural capital, a unified indicator of weak sustainability (the 
genuine savings rate). All four indicators of democracy we examine show that freer societies have 
higher genuine savings rates because they invest more in human capital, create less CO2 damage, and 
extract fewer natural resources per economic unit produced, even if they show lower net investment in 
manufactured capital. Democracies may trade off immediate material welfare gains for future pay-offs. 
This finding justifies why scholars should assess the effects of regime type on more than just 
immediate growth or the rate of change of manufactured capital. Among democracies, we find that 
pure parliamentary systems spend more on education than do presidential ones, but exhibit no 
statistically significant difference for the overall genuine savings rate. Proportional representation 
electoral systems fare worse than plurality when it comes to genuine and net national savings, even 
though they do better on education spending. The results taken together show that differences in 
regime type and democratic institutional design allow for different trade-offs. The results are robust to 
a range of specifications and a developing country only sub-sample. 
This version: December 2004… sustainable development is a process of change in which the 
exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation 
of technological development … are all in harmony and enhance both 
current and future potential to meet human needs (WCED 1987: 46). 
The late Mancur Olson (1993: 575) lamented that ‘the moral appeal of democracy is now almost 
universally appreciated, but its economic advantages are scarcely understood.’ Since then, however, 
there has been enormous effort devoted to the topic of democracy’s economic (dis)advantages, 
unfortunately the bulk of it to the issue of economic growth, the rate at which manufactured capital 
accumulates, the dynamics of budget deficits, government consumption and the like (Barro 1998; 
Olson 2000; Przeworski et al. 2000). In addition, many studies discuss and examine the effects of 
institutional design among democracies on public policy performance and its economic consequences 
in similar terms (Lijphart 1984, 1999; Powell 2000; Persson, Roland and Tabillini 1997, 2003; Strøm, 
Müller, and Bergman 2004). But not all public spending is the same.  Increases in income can be 
coterminous with declining future well-being due to unsustainable use of natural and environmental 
assets and insufficient investment in the skills and knowledge of human beings, the gatekeepers of the 
future capital stock (Atkinson et al. 1999; Dasgupta and Mäler 2001; López 2003; Neumayer 2003; 
Pearce and Warford 1993; WCED 1987).  
  According to the pioneers of the concept of sustainable development, humanity is obliged “to 
ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own” (WCED 1987: 8). Achieving sustainability requires conscious decisions about how 
best to augment total capital, including natural and human capital. How then does regime type affect 
the paths of economic, or so-called weak sustainability of societies? We test several different measures 
of democracy and democratic institutional design on the World Bank’s indicator of weak sustainability 
(genuine savings), which measures the rate at which investment in manufactured, human, and natural 
capital exceeds its depreciation (Hamilton 2000; World Bank 2002).
1
Genuine savings is net national savings (mainly net investment in manufactured capital) minus 
resource depletion (fuel, minerals, ores, metals, and forests), minus costs of CO2 pollution, plus 
                                                      
1 The term ‘genuine savings’ was coined by Kirk Hamilton and subsequently appears as ‘net adjusted savings’ in 
the World Development Indicators.  
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investment in human capital. While traditional national accounting treats government spending on 
education as consumption, the adjusted savings treats it as a proxy variable for investment in human 
capital. The importance of genuine savings stems from its ability to indicate whether changes in the 
total capital stock are beneficial or detrimental to future well-being. As Dasgupta (2001: 87) has 
written, 
Genuine investment is the social worth of net changes in an 
economy’s capital assets. It is a comprehensive notion, including as it 
does the social worth of net changes in manufactured and human 
capital, public knowledge, and natural capital. Thus, ensuring that 
social well-being is sustainable involves taking care that the 
economy’s assets are managed well.  
The genuine savings rate, or genuine investment rate as Dasgupta (2001) prefers to call it, 
captures the trade-offs policy makers face in allocating resources for the maintenance and 
enhancement of various forms of capital. In other words, it measures how ‘well’ they manage a 
country’s total capital stock. If resources are being used unsustainably, together with higher pollution, 
and lower investment in human capital, then a society is ostensibly on an unsustainable path of 
development (Dasgupta 2001; Hamilton and Clemens 1999). This approach is known as weak 
sustainability. In contrast, strong sustainability is the view that all natural capital should be kept intact 
and that substitutability between forms of capital is either not possible or very strictly limited. In this 
paper we focus on weak sustainability since we believe sustainability must leave at least some room 
for substitutability. Also, weak sustainability is a necessary condition for achieving strong 
sustainability.  
Our results are easy to summarize. Controlling for a range of economic, political, demographic, 
and social variables, we find that higher levels of political democracy are associated with higher 
genuine savings because democracies invest more in human capital, create less CO2 damage and 
extract fewer natural resources per unit of economic output produced for creating wealth, even if they 
accumulate manufactured capital at lower rates than autocracies. Among the democracies alone, we 
find few differences among parliamentary, direct presidential and mixed systems. Proportional 
representation electoral systems are negatively associated with genuine savings, through lower net 
national savings rates, even though they have higher levels of educational spending compared with 
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plurality electoral systems. The level of fractionalization in government does not matter for the overall 
genuine savings rate. While the results on institutional variations within democracies on sustainability 
and its components are mixed, we establish quite robustly that democracies outperform autocracies, 
results that are consistent across several measures of democracy. 
Our results suggest that scholars interested in the behavior of democratic governments under 
differing institutional environments should assess the nature of the trade-offs inherent in economic 
policy making, not just judge single dimensions, such as economic growth, budget deficits, or welfare 
spending. Our results suggest that despite possible negative effects of democracy on short-term 
economic growth and investment in manufactured capital, democracy promotes the long-term welfare 
of society by raising the genuine savings rate. They also caution against the popular presumption that 
the combination of parliamentary system with proportional election is the most beneficial one, at least 
when it comes to achieving sustainability. 
The article is structured as follows: We first discuss issues surrounding democracy and weak 
sustainability. We then introduce our measure of sustainability, present the methods, data and results 
and conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings. 
 
How Does Democracy Affect Sustainability? 
Research on democracy and socio-economic outcomes has been mainly undertaken in three broad 
areas. First, scholars have addressed the effect of democracy on public expenditures, investment in 
manufactured and human capital and economic development. The second area of research is on the 
effect of democracy on the environment and patterns of resource extraction, whilst the third area is on 
the effect of institutional design within democracies on public policy performance. 
Starting with the first strand of research, regime type could affect sustainability through public 
expenditures, investment in manufactured and human capital and its effect on per capita income. The 
post-war focus on economic development and the ideological rivalry between the superpowers 
heightened interest in democracy and development, often operationalized as economic growth (Sirowy 
and Inkeles 1991). In general, an early consensus emerged to suggest that there was a “cruel dilemma” 
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between democracy and development (Bhagwati 1966). Democracies at low income levels were 
regarded as inherently unstable and since political instability deters development, it was better to let 
development bring democracy in its train (Huntington 1968). The rapid growth of authoritarian East 
Asian countries stood in stark contrast with democratic “failures” in many parts of the globe. 
Recently, however, the rush to freedom prompted a fresher focus on democracy’s economic 
impact. This research was also driven by interest in endogenous growth theory in economics, and 
interest in new institutionalism in several fields of the social sciences. Technological change, 
investment decisions, and other important sources of growth are endogenous to societies and are 
determined by political institutions as much as by market forces (Barro 1998; Lucas 1988; North 1990; 
Romer 1986). The new round of empirical analyses yielded mixed results, but the weight of the 
evidence suggests that democracy has no direct relationship with growth. Yet it may influence growth 
indirectly via higher rates of accumulation of human capital (Baum and Lake 2003; Krieckhaus 2004; 
Lake and Baum 2001; Przeworski et al. 2000; Przeworski and Limongi 1993). Others argued that 
democracies promoted efficiency because it they created political stability for investors and promote 
technological development because of higher quality entrepreneurial talent (Olson 1993). Even if 
communist dictatorships sported very high growth rates in the post-war years, they were unsustainable 
because dictatorship and autarchy were inefficient at producing high quality goods and sustaining high 
levels of wealth over time. Moreover, the wealth that had been created often came at the expense of 
environmental quality, as many parts of the old USSR attest to. It may also have come at the expense 
of social capital, which is manifest in the social upheaval in many parts of the USSR and the Balkans. 
The expected superiority of democracy to create wealth is rarely supported in the data, however, and 
as some suggest, once human capital is accounted for, democracy is associated negatively with growth 
(Barro 1998; Barro 1996; Gasiorowski 2000). China, on average, does much better than India despite 
the recent surge in the country’s growth rates, Vietnam better than Bangladesh etc. However, 
autocracies seem to have a higher variability in their growth rates than democracies. Well-run 
autocracies do better than democracies, but poorly run autocracies also do much worse (Almeida and 
Ferreira 2002). 
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Those who see democracy conflicting with economic development argue that democracies 
succumb to populist tendencies and redistribute wealth, which may reduce investment and destroy 
entrepreneurial talent (de Schweinitz 1964; Haggard 1990; Keech 1995). Populism could lead to 
profligate spending that increases inflation and reduces savings and investment, thereby affecting 
growth and sustainability (Mueller and Stratmann 2003).
2 Moreover, democratic governments might 
run high deficits because organized labor will lobby for higher wages at the same time as demand for 
the provision of public goods in the general population rises. Indeed, several scholars show that 
democracies have larger governments (Boix 2001). High demand for spending, lower ability to collect 
taxes coupled with low growth could mean a vicious circle leading into unsustainable development.
3 
The future could be squandered for present consumption. Profligate spending patterns may come with 
high rent-seeking and special interest politics. Such politics leads to larger government spending that 
may hamper growth and efficient investment, which may add up to unsustainable use of resources and 
environmental damage, even if democracies are found to spend more on human capital. 
Despite the heavy focus on growth, no study to date has addressed the degree to which 
democracies are able to trade off possible profligate patterns of spending with sustainable allocation of 
resources over the longer run. While most scholars focus on regime type and the size of the public 
sector itself, what really matters is on what the money is spent and how this affects weak 
sustainability. Wasteful government expenditures, such as a good deal of military expenditures and the 
latest model of aircraft for the President, are different from productive expenditures for the education 
of people. Neither do those who find that democracies spend more on public goods tell us the 
opportunity costs incurred in the process. In short, the existing empirical evidence on how democracies 
and autocracies may promote sustainability via capital investment and public expenditures is both 
 
2 There is little empirical work to date on public and private savings behavior under democratic and authoritarian 
conditions (Edwards 1995; Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén 1999). The World Bank has an entire research 
section on this, which has thus far not addressed how democracy associates with savings behavior (Loayza, 
Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén 2000).  
3 Some find that there is no difference in the tax rates between democracies and autocracies, however (Cheibub 
1998).  
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mixed and insufficient as it is not clearly focused on the trade-offs inherent in the sustainability 
concept. 
The second broad area of research focuses on democracy’s effects on the environment and 
ecosystems upon which future welfare depends as well as on the rate and sustainability of natural 
resource extraction. Here the arguments made are similar to those made with respect to economic 
growth. Some have suggested that democracies are likely to sacrifice society’s long-term welfare to 
short-term gains for individuals, that democracies fail to adopt necessary but painful policies of 
restructuring, or that they pursue strategies based on electoral considerations, not coherent policy, and 
that democracy is often “captured” by rapacious “capitalists,” whose search for profits is granted 
priority over communitarian interests. Even democracies with strong left-wing governments may be 
unsympathetic to measures of environmental protection because of electoral pressures to create growth 
and employment.
4 But it is more common today to argue the opposite effect. Payne (1995) summarizes 
five broad arguments as to why democracy should have a beneficial effect on environmental 
protection: 1) democracy creates a political climate in which information can flow freely and citizens 
can act on that information to organize and press demands upon government, 2) democratic 
government is responsive to popular demands and 3) democratic governments are better able to 
implement innovative policies and draw lessons from successes and failures, 4) democratic 
governments are more likely to participate in international cooperative ventures to solve global 
problems, including environmental problems; and 5) democracies are often market-based economic 
systems and these can be harnessed to provide environmental as well as purely economic benefits. In 
other words, democracies should get the mix of policies for sustainability right. 
The empirical evidence for the impact of democracy on the environment is mixed. Gleditsch and 
Sverdrup (1995) examine the relationship among democracy, development and ‘good environmental 
 
4 Of course, growth and job creation and the “greed” of capitalists can drive sustainability by creating wealth, but 
the question is: at what environmental cost? See Gleditsch and Sverdrup (1995) for a summary of the arguments 
against democracy, and Neumayer (2003b) for a discussion of left-wing politics and environmental issues. 
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performance’ using nine environmental indicators.
5 They find that democracy has a positive effect on 
the environment, although its positive effect on development results in environmental damage, 
sometimes outweighing beneficial effects. Democracy’s primary effect on the environment seems to 
come from the mobilization of counter forces that lessen environmental problems to some extent. 
Gleditsch and Sverdrup (1995: 15) conclude that “it seems clear that how people organize themselves 
matters.” On the other hand, Midlarsky (1998: 358) found ‘no uniform relationship between 
democracy and the environment.’ For three indicators of environmental quality (deforestation, CO2 
emissions, and soil erosion by water), he found significant negative relationships between democracy 
and environmental quality. Two studies undertaken by economists similarly fail to provide consistent 
and robust evidence for a beneficial effect of democracy on air and water pollution even though the 
majority of the evidence weighs in democracy’s favor (Torras and Boyce 1998 and Barrett and Graddy 
2000). In a more recent effort, Reuveny and Li (2004) find that democracy leads to lower CO2 
emissions per capita, lower NOx emissions per capita, less organic pollution in water, lower 
deforestation rates, and less land degradation. They conclude that democracy reduces the extent of 
human activities that directly degrade the environment. 
Democracy can also affect the rate and sustainability of natural resource extraction. The so-
called ‘resource curse’ literature argues that corrupt, elitist and non-accountable governments extract 
natural resources ferociously and channel resource rents into non-productive wasteful consumption 
expenditures as well as private savings of the small ruling elite on foreign bank accounts (Auty 2001). 
Democratic governments need to spread the benefits from resource extraction more evenly across 
society and need to show that they have put the rents to productive use for the social good, as 
otherwise they will be punished at the ballot box. Also, some argue that democracies on average are 
less prone to corruption (Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000). Of course, causality runs in both directions as 
many have noted how natural resource abundance hinders the development of a civil society and 
 
5 They include the following negative indicators: 1) emissions of climate gases per capita; 2) emissions of CO2 
per capita, 3) deforestation, 4) threats to biodiversity, 5) lack of safe drinking water, 6) lack of sanitary services 
and 7) population growth. Their positive indicators are 8) signed and ratified environmental treaties and 9) 
number of environmental organizations. 
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democratic forms of governance (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Ross 2001). However, natural 
resource abundance does not necessarily imply non-democratic governance as Bolivia, Botswana, 
Chile, Ecuador, Papua New Guinea, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela and other examples attest.  
The third broad area of research that speaks to this issue is the differing effect of democratic 
institutional design on public policy performance. The question may not only be one of democracy 
versus authoritarianism, but also what types of democracy matter most? Research in comparative 
politics has long been concerned with the question of how institutional design affects political 
outcomes (Diamond  and Plattner 1993; Lijphart 1984; Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000; Rockman and 
Weaver 1993; Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2004). In this line of research, democracies are not created 
equal. They exist in a variety of institutional forms, varying along such lines as electoral rules, 
presidential versus parliamentary government, federal versus centralized authority, unitary versus 
coalitional government structures etc. These differing institutional features in turn shape the policy 
arena in ways that lead to different outcomes. 
Arendt Lijphart (1984, 1999), for example, identifies two broad categories of democracy — 
consensual and majoritarian. According to Lijphart (1999: 275–300), the bundle of institutional 
features that make up the consensus model of governing results in a more democratic system (more 
representative, more accountable to the voter, less corrupt, less removed from the people, with greater 
political quality, higher voter turn out and more satisfied constituents). It apparently produces better 
policy (with a strong community orientation and imbued with social consciousness), and in a better 
manner (more consultative and inclusive). Lijpart’s two influential categories and Powell’s (2000) 
distinction between majoritarian and proportional visions are both composites of several institutional 
features. They are more sophisticated versions of the older arguments for the virtues of parliamentary 
government compared to the presidential model and the virtues of proportional representation (PR) 
compared to those of a majoritarian electoral system.
6 There are, however, commonalities in the 
reasoning at work in both literatures.  
 
6 For a review of issues, see Rockman and Weaver (1993) and Müller, Bergman, and Strøm (2004). 
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Institutional design then configures democracy in ways that moderate the degrees to which 
representation, delegation, and accountability function (Müller, Bergman, and Strøm 2004; 
Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999). Thus, different types of democracy will vary in their capacity to 
accommodate new demands (Rockman and Weaver 1993; Vogel 1993), solve the agency problem 
between the voters and their representatives and the representatives and public officials who carry out 
policy, and they will differ in the number and nature of each system’s “veto-points” that would allow 
(or constrain) policy change at will (Crepaz 1998). They will also differ in the degree to which 
parochial, or special interests dominate the policy agenda to the detriment of general social welfare 
(Persson and Tabellini 1999). On the whole, the parliamentary-PR combination emerges with the more 
positive evaluation since it is associated with stronger representation of diffuse and general as opposed 
to special interests (Crepaz 1998). Yet again, empirical findings have been mixed (Cheibub, 
Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004; Müller, Bergman, and Strøm 2004). 
How does this debate relate to questions of democracy and sustainability? Of particular interest 
here is the impact of institutional design on public spending. It is argued that proportional 
representation frequently leads to the necessity of forming coalitional governments, leading to greater 
fractionalization, which in turn increases government instability, which in turn results in higher 
government spending and larger budget deficits (Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 2003; Roubini and 
Sachs 1989). Moreover, a divided government without proper checks and balances is supposed to 
drive spending since each organ of government will pursue its own spending agenda (Persson, Roland, 
and Tabellini 1997). Politicians manage to appropriate more rents for themselves in such systems. 
Others dispute these broad claims on empirical grounds (Beck et al. n.d.; Borrelli and Royed 1995). In 
this literature, it is frequently assumed that this larger spending is undesirable policy performance, 
with the implication that such spending is not sustainable over the long run. For our purposes, 
however, it is not enough to note that differing institutional choices are supposed to effect fiscal and 
other related policies. Instead, what matters is what the money is spent on. Interestingly, while 
parliamentary regimes have higher spending, they also provide more public goods than presidential 
regimes (Persson, Roland and Tabellini 2000). The same is true for proportional as opposed to 
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plurality electoral systems, which spend more on goods grounded in local interests (Lizzeri and 
Persico 2001; Milessi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno 2002). Fredriksson and Millimet (2004a) report 
that parliamentary systems have higher taxes on gasoline consumption, which they interpret as 
environmental taxes even though this is problematic as their main purpose might be revenue raising. 
Fredriksson and Millimet (2004b) provide evidence that regimes with a proportional electoral system 
have stricter environmental policies. Even with respect to economic growth, Persson (2004) reports 
that reforming authoritarian regimes into parliamentary democracies with proportional representation 
seems to boost the adoption of growth-promoting structural policies, whereas converting autocracies 
into presidential plurality democratic systems does not. 
From the many possible sets of institutional features that make up the world’s democracies, we 
examine whether parliamentary systems outperform presidential ones, and whether the type of 
electoral system (proportional representation, plurality, or mixed) affects sustainability and its 
components, controlling for the degree of fragmentation within government. Given the number of 
possible institutional design features that could be included in such testing and the variations within 
the category of parliamentary systems, testing only two (albeit central ones) can constitute only a first 
cut at the issue of the impact of institutional design on weak sustainability. Nevertheless, knowing 
broad patterns of empirical association is valuable not only for instructing the academic debate on the 
subject, but also for those debating and revising constitutions to create better social outcomes. 
This paper will contribute to the debate on institutional design in at least two ways. First, much 
of the parliamentary-presidential, PR-majoritarian debate concentrates heavily upon the established 
OECD democracies over the course of a few years. Our data set stretches well beyond these in both 
time and space, greatly enlarging the number of data points available for analysis. Second, the research 
on public spending focuses heavily on the level of spending and the size of government, but does not 
address the type of spending. Some forms of spending, such as on education are clearly better for 
economic sustainability. We test these democratic, institutional features on yet another measure of 
overall economic policymaking and its outcomes, namely sustainability. Our measure of sustainability 
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and its components (discussed below) allow us to say more about on what money is spent on as well as 
to gauge the trade-offs inherent in economic and social policymaking. 
 
How to measure weak sustainability? 
As the seminal publication on sustainable development by the World Commission on Environment 
and Development (WCED) quoted at the outset suggests, sustainability is a process that depends on 
the nature of investments that a society chooses to make towards the future. The World Bank tries to 
capture this dimension with the genuine savings rate. It is calculated as follows: 
GS = (investment in manufactured capital – net foreign borrowing + 
net official transfers – depreciation of manufactured capital + current 
education expenditures – net depreciation of natural capital and cost 
of atmospheric pollution) / Gross National Income (GNI) 
Note that investment in manufactured capital minus foreign borrowing plus net official transfers minus 
depreciation of manufactured capital is equal to net national savings. While the traditional national 
accounting treats government spending on education as consumption, the adjusted savings treats it as 
investment. This is regarded as a first approximation to the full value of human capital investment, 
which is difficult to measure precisely. Depreciation of natural capital covers non-renewable resource 
extraction such as fossil fuels and minerals as well as forestry and is measured as price minus average 
cost times the amount of resources extracted. Cost of atmospheric pollution is approximated by the 
damage caused by carbon dioxide emissions. It is apparent then from the formula above that negative 
genuine savings could be driven by high consumption (i.e. low investment in manufactured capital), 
high resource depletion, high pollution, while investment in education remains low, which would 
clearly lead to a profligate, unsustainable path for a society. On the other hand, higher genuine savings 
is achieved via investment in manufactured capital with relatively lower depletion of the resource base, 
higher investment in human capital and lower damage to the environment. Quite simply, then, savings 
of all forms of capita is the essence of sustainability (Atkinson et al. 1999). 
Until quite recently, economists viewed the growth of gross domestic product (GDP) as the 
yardstick of development. Gross domestic product and the investment required for the growth of 
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output were thought of as involving merely manufactured capital (and sometimes human capital). The 
degradation of natural capital in the process of economic activity was unaccounted in GDP statistics. 
Green accounting processes began as an important corrective for making GDP reflect the degradation 
of the environment and the depletion of natural resources as a result of economic production. In 
reaction to this, the World Bank embarked on estimating the ‘Wealth of Nations’ to include 
manufactured, human, and natural capital of countries as a first step towards monitoring the progress 
of nations in terms of sustainability (World Bank 1997). The changes in the redefined estimates of 
wealth, therefore, indicate whether the development trajectory of any given country is unsustainable 
over time. Importantly, however, these data also show that the most important component of most 
nations’ capital stocks is human capital (unfortunately, social capital is left out of the calculations 
because of the complex issues surrounding its measurability). These results are another source of 
caution as to why debates around regime types and institutional variation that look at single measures 
such as government spending should be cautious about substantive interpretations of results. Since 
traditional national accounts treats spending on education as consumption one might be led to believe 
that all spending is wasteful. However, spending on developing skills and knowledge of people is not 
the same as burning public money in wasteful expenditures. The World Bank’s measure of 
sustainability allows us to explore this issue. An added advantage is that the data are available in time-
series format for a large number of countries spanning over 25 years. Genuine savings data are taken 
from the World Bank’s (2002) World Development Indicators (WDI) CD-Rom, where they are called 
“net adjusted savings”. We use this source, but we drop Angola and Sudan from the sample since their 
data seem to be reported with error as they are often below -100% and are inconsistent with other data 
published at the Bank’s website. In addition, the 1991 value for Kuwait was set to missing as it was 
unusually low and clearly affected by the Iraq occupation and the ensuing Second Gulf War. 
 
Methods & Data 
This study employs pooled time-series, cross-section (TSCS) data to gauge the effect of democracy 
and its institutional design on the genuine savings rate and each of the components of this composite 
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measure. Given our arguments about gauging democracy’s effects on a composite indicator that 
capture some sense of trade-offs implicit in policymaking, we focus primarily on the genuine savings 
rate (which is the composite), but also test each of the components. We think that it is useful to know 
through which of the four components democracy and its institutional features affect sustainability. 
While we should ideally model each component with relevant controls for each, we keep the models 
the same for each component using the same control variables as when the overall genuine savings rate 
is the dependent variable. This tactic is not entirely satisfactory since each of the components should 
ideally be modeled separately. We hope to pursue this further in future research. 
The data allow up to 129 countries to be tested with all controls included. We first discuss the 
control variables in the model and then our operationalization of regime type and institutional design. 
There are no clear models to guide the determinants of genuine savings. We control for the following 
factors because of their theoretical connection with our measures of democracy, or their direct effects 
on the dependent variable. In general, the models account for important factors predicting the net 
national savings rate, so as to control as fully as possible, but parsimoniously, for its determinants.
7 
Note that fiscal policy variables such as government expenditures, tax revenues etc. cannot be included 
in the estimations as explanatory variables since they form part of GS and their inclusion would 
therefore effectively construct a partial identity between the left-hand side and the right-hand side of 
the equation.  
The models control for level of per capita income since richer countries have higher savings 
rates and supposedly exhibit better environmental standards on several dimensions (Baghwati 1999; 
Frankel 2003; Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven 2000; Ogaki, Ostry, and Reinhart 1995; Shafik 
1994). We use Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in purchasing power parity. All the data are 
 
7 We have largely relied on the World Bank’s research program on savings across the world to pick several 
variables found to be associated with public and private savings rates (Loayza et al. 1998). The basic model 
employs per capita wealth, growth rate, and urbanization. For robustness, we also test investment rate, broad 
money supply (m2/GDP), and age dependency ratio. Using these variables lowers the sample of countries 
considerably. The World Bank’s research on savings can be accessed at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/savings/savinwld.htm. 
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obtained from World Bank (2002) unless noted otherwise.
8 We also include a squared income term to 
allow for a diminishing effect of per capita income on weak sustainability.
9 We control for the year-to-
year change in per capita income levels (economic growth), since it is often thought that higher rates 
of growth require more intensive use of environmental resources, but it is also often found to be 
associated with the rate of investment in manufactured capital. On the other hand, higher growth may 
enable increases in other forms of capital, such as manufactured and human capital that reduce the 
direct dependence of people on natural resources (Coxhead and Jayasuriya 2003; Loayza et al. 1998). 
There is mixed evidence on the effects of growth rates on pollution and environmental quality 
(Grossman and Krueger 1995; Strern, Common, and Barbier 1996). 
The level of democracy, savings rates, and environmental stress can be affected by demographic 
factors (Dahl and Tufte 1974; MEA 2003).
10 Thus, population size (total population), population 
density (people per square kilometer), and the share of urban population in total population are 
included in the models. Urbanization has important implications for levels of pollution and investment 
in manufactured capital because it is argued that consumption rises with rising urbanization (Shafik 
1994). Democracy also relates to trade openness. Many argue that democracy increases openness 
(Milner 1999). Trade relates positively with the genuine savings rate because of its association with 
higher efficiency and less corruption (Frankel and Romer 1999; Gatti 1999; Wei 2000). On the other 
hand, trade openness is also related to higher government spending (Rodrik 1996). Our measure of 
trade dependence is simply the sum of imports and exports divided by GDP. 
The models include the degree to which countries are dependent on natural resource exports 
because resource depletion will be higher among these countries. Several early studies on the topic 
indicate a strong relationship between resource exports and lower genuine savings. Apparently, high 
 
8 The dataset and Stata do-files to generate the results will be made available upon publication. 
9 Note that some of the dimensions of the sustainability index, such as CO2 damage will be affected in the 
opposite direction given the logic of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), which is that pollution increases 
with rising income but diminishes at higher levels (Frankel 2003). 
10 Neo-Malthusian views and anti-globalization views generally coincide on issues of sustainable development. 
There is a lively debate in the literature between the neo-Malthusians and the cornucopians, or those who think 
substitution of natural resources with human ingenuity is possible. For the classic debate, see (Myers and Simon 
1994). Most texts on environmental security and economic sustainability sample this debate (Conca and Dabelko 
1998). 
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resource dependence often leads to low growth, lower than normal investment in human capital, and 
other maladies that hamper sustainability – the familiar ‘resource curse’ hypothesis highlighted in the 
literature (Atkinson and Hamilton 2003; Auty 2001; Gylfason 2000; Hamilton 2001; Sachs and 
Warner 2001). We use a discrete variable that takes the value of one if exports of petroleum are greater 
than 30% of GDP as our control variable.
11 This measure is obtained from an independent source 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003). All these variables are lagged one year to mitigate simultaneity bias and 
some are logged to mitigate the effect of extreme values. 
Finally, control variables for experience with armed conflict, which presumably influences 
savings rates and the degree to which extractive activity, corruption, and accumulation of 
manufactured capital proceeds. We compute a count of peace years since 1946 with the help of the 
BTSCS method of Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998) utilizing the Uppsala-PRIO civil war data that uses a 
threshold of 25 or more battle deaths to be counted as war (Gleditsch et al. 2002). We also add the 
incidence of civil war to account for ongoing civil war, again taken from the Uppsala-PRIO data. The 
baseline model is then: 
GS = β0+β1 x income+β2 x income
2+β3 x growth+β4 x population+β5 x 
trade+β6 x density+β7 x urbanization+β8 x fuel exports+β9 x mineral 
exports+β10 x civil war+β11 x peace years+β12 x year (linear form) … 
To this baseline model containing 12 control variables, we add our regime type and institutional 
variables selectively. What democracy is and how exactly to measure it are thorny questions (Bollen 
and Paxton 2000; Collier and Levitsky 1997; Dahl 2000; Freedom House 2004; Gurr and Jaggers 
1995). Some capture dimensions of democracy somewhat differently than the most widely used 
measure in political science, the Polity data (Gurr and Jaggers 1995; Henisz 2000; Vanhanen 2000).
12 
As Bollen and Paxton (2000) show, there are biases that systematically enter into the coding of 
democracy in subjective indicators, such as the Freedom House (2004) data on political and civil 
liberties.
13 Alternatively, one could use objectively derived data based on voting turnout and the 
narrowness of electoral victory, or competition, between parties for control of the government 
 
11 We have no data for other resources, but note that oil is by far the major natural resource in value terms. 
12 The Polity data are available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity. 
13 The Freedom House data are available at: www.freedomhouse.org. 
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(Vanhanen 2000).
14 Vanhanen’s measure captures Robert Dahl’s (2000) conceptualization of 
democracy as “Polyarchy,” which is an equally weighted index of the level of electoral participation 
and degree of party competition at elections. Whatever the conceptualization of democracy, the 
measures currently in use are very highly correlated with each other. Some scholars have warned, 
however, that even though measures of democracy differently arrived at correlate well, they are not 
interchangeable (Casper and Tufis 2002). We adopt their advice and follow a strategy of testing 
several accepted measures that stress one or another theoretical aspect of why democracy matters for 
sustainable development. 
For our purposes, the democracy measure should capture adequately dimensions that reflect 
such aspects as representation and accountability, which matter for the various issues over 
sustainability discussed above. Secondarily, the measure should reflect normative aspects, such as the 
degree to which people enjoy political and civil rights. People are either free to squander or save! 
Thus, we employ the Polity data as our primary measure of democracy, but we also test Polyarchy (the 
only measure of democracy that is coded on the basis of actual electoral data), and Freedom House’s 
civil and political liberties index. In short, Polity gauges the nature of the election of government and 
constraints on executive power, Polyarchy measures objective levels of participation and competition, 
and Freedom House’s data capture the degree of political rights and civil liberties. 
The Polity IV (version 2) dataset codes 5 institutional dimensions of democracy. This version of 
the data corrects in weighted form the interregnum years that were previously coded as missing. The 
Polity measure gauges democracy and autocracy along six dimensions: 
a. institutional measures regarding transfer of executive power 
b. extent to which executive power is subject to competitive elections 
c. extent of opportunities for non-elites to gain executive power 
d. de facto constraints on the executive 
e. extent of opportunity for political expression 
 
14 The Vanhanen Polyarchy data are available at: http://www.sv.ntnu.no/iss/data/vanhanen/. 
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f. extent to which non-elites have access to institutional structures for 
political expression 
We follow the norm by subtracting the autocracy value from the democracy value, adding 11 to create 
an overall scale of democracy ranging from 1 to 21. Since we are interested in all increases of 
democracy from a previous level, we utilize the entire scale, but we also test a dummy variable for 
regime type by assigning the value 1 if democracy ranges from 16–21, and 0 if the values are between 
1 and 15 (autocracy) to accommodate those who argue that a regime is either democratic or not 
(Przeworski et al. 2000). This variable correlates almost perfectly (r = 0.96) with others who have used 
the Polity data in a dichotomous manner (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Polyarchy is the degree of 
competition, derived as 100 minus the share of the largest winning party’s vote times the percentage 
share of votes cast relative to total population. In other words, polyarchy captures the narrowness of 
victory by the largest winning party in any general election times the number of people participating in 
deciding (see Vanhanen 2000 for details). Democracy, thus, is a function of both dimensions. For the 
Freedom House measure, we use the sum of scores of both dimensions of the Freedom House data — 
political rights and civil liberties — and invert the scores so that the index of rights stretches from 2 
(least free) to 14 (most free).
15
After tests of democracy’s effect on sustainability, we look at the impact of institutional design 
on sustainability among the democracies in the following manner. We employ the World Bank’s 
Dataset on Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001), which gauges the type of political system, the 
electoral system for choosing legislators, and the degree of fractionalization of government. We 
include dummy variables for pure parliamentary systems and the mixed category of ‘presidents chosen 
by an elected assembly’, leaving out the direct presidential system as the omitted reference category. 
Electoral systems are either built on pure proportionality or plurality systems or a mixture thereof. For 
the mixed types, we use Beck et al.’s (2001) information on how the majority of the parliamentary 
seats are chosen to decide whether the electoral system is principally one of proportionality or 
 
15 The Freedom House scores for 1981 are scored until August 1982 and scores for 1982 stretch from August to 
November 1983. Thus we take the 1981 scores for 1982 also (gap between August and December). In this way, 
the scores from August 1982-November 1983 become scores for 1983 (1 month gap), and scores from November 
1983-November 1984 become scores for 1984 etc.  
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plurality. We include a dummy variable for proportional electoral systems, leaving the plurality 
systems as the omitted reference category. Government fractionalization is measured as the probability 
that two randomly picked members of the government will belong to the same political party. 
Proportional representation systems are supposed to lead to greater government fractionalization, but 
the bivariate correlation between these two variables is low, r=0.19. We restrict these sets of analyses 
only to countries that make the required threshold on the Polity scale to be coded as a democracy (see 
above). The appendix contains summary descriptive variable information and bivariate correlation 
matrices. 
The analysis of time-series cross-section (TSCS) data generally poses several problems in the 
estimating process. TSCS models often allow for temporally and serially correlated errors as well as 
for heteroskedasticity. The well-known Parks method based on the feasible generalized least squares 
method (FGLS), which is close to the OLS method, is discredited for underestimating the true 
variability of the parameter estimates, which some report to be as high as 200% (Beck and Katz 1995). 
They propose ‘panel corrected standard errors’ (PCSE) as an alternative procedure. We use this 
method, assuming an AR1 process to deal with autocorrelation. The Rho coefficient computed in the 
AR1 process accounts for serially correlated errors in the model (Stata 2003). 
 
Results 
Table 1 reports the PCSE regression results of regime type on the genuine savings rate for each of the 
indicators of democracy.  
 
------------------------------------Table 1 about here----------------------------- 
 
The first column reports results with the continuous Polity index. As seen there, democracy has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on genuine savings, net of the control variables. A one-point 
increase in the polity scale increases genuine savings by 0.16 points, which means a shift from a 
perfect autocracy of value 1 on the index to a perfect democracy of value 21 would mean an increase 
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of 3.6 points of the genuine savings rate. Since the mean GS score is 6.6, this would effectively mean 
that moving from strict autocracy to perfect democracy increases average GS by roughly 48%. For the 
dummy variable constructed from the Polity index in column 2, moving from an autocracy to a 
democracy increases the genuine savings rate by 1.8 points, or 27% of the average genuine savings 
rate over the 25-year period. In column 3, we see that an increase of 1% in the combined level of 
participation and competition increases the genuine savings rate by .07 points. Raising the polyarchy 
score from its minimum to its maximum level increases the genuine savings rate by 3.3 points. For the 
remaining measure of democracy, Freedom House’s civil and political liberties index, a one point 
increase raises the genuine savings rate by 0.20 points and a move from minimum to maximum by 2.4 
points. 
The control variables largely test in accordance with theoretical expectations. Higher per capita 
income raises genuine savings, but at a diminishing rate. Economic growth is not a statistically 
significant determinant. Greater trade openness, a larger population size and density are associated 
with higher genuine savings, whereas the opposite is the case for major oil exporters and the 
urbanization rate. Civil war experience has a negative effect on the genuine savings rate. A longer 
period of peace years raises the genuine savings rate. 
We now turn to Polity’s effects on each of the components of genuine savings, namely net 
national savings (mainly net investment in manufactured capital), education expenditures, carbon 
dioxide damage caused and resource depletion, all relative to a country’s GNI.
16 Table 2, column 1, 
shows that increasing democracy decreases the net national savings rate. Democracies seem to 
consume more and invest less in manufactured capital than autocracies. This result is also true for 
Polyarchy, and Freedom House’s political and civil liberties index (see tables 3 & 4). 
 
------------------------------Tables 2, 3, & 4 about here ---------------------------- 
 
 
16 Note that because in PCSE regressions a separate Rho coefficient of auto-correlation is estimated in each 
regression, the coefficients of variables in the regressions on the sub-components of sustainability will not 
necessarily add up to the coefficient size of variables in the regression on the aggregate sustainability measure. 
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Table 2, column 2 reveals, however, that democracies as measured by Polity invest more in 
human capital, measured as education spending. This result holds for the other two indicators of 
democracy as well. Democracy is also good news for those concerned about CO2
  pollution (see 
column 3). While the Polity measure and Freedom House are associated with less CO2 emissions per 
economic unit produced, the Polyarchy measure has the same negative coefficient sign, but is not 
statistically significant. Our results support others who show that democracy reduces atmospheric 
pollution, net of the level of income (Reuveny and Li 2004). In Table 2, column 4, Polity democracy is 
negatively related to resource depletion, and this result is net of the major oil export dummy variable. 
This result too is common to all the indicators of democracy (tables 3, column 4 & tables 4, column 4). 
It seems that democratic politics might be a way to solve problems of resource abuse, but democracy 
might be hard to achieve given the difficulties of democratization within countries abundant in natural 
resources, which are also often plagued by political instabilities and civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 
2001; de Soysa 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Ross 2001). We now 
turn to institutional design among the democracies and its effect on genuine savings and its 
components. Note that despite the high correlation between the political system and electoral system 
variables, we include both simultaneously. Entering them separately instead hardly affects results. 
Table 5 shows that among democracies, the distinction between type of government system 
(direct presidential, presidential-parliamentary, and parliamentary) does not matter decisively for the 
aggregated measure of sustainability, genuine savings (column 1). In column 2, it seems that it does 
not matter for net national savings either. In column 3, parliamentary systems have higher education 
expenditures than the direct presidential system. Presidential systems with an elected assembly are 
associated with higher CO2 damage than direct presidential systems in column 4. For resource 
depletion, the type of government system does not matter (column 5). The result on education 
spending generally supports those who find that pure parliamentary systems spend more, albeit in this 
case on education. With respect to electoral systems, PR electoral systems have a decidedly negative 
effect relative to plurality systems on the genuine savings rate. PR systems also show a significantly 
negative effect on net national savings (manufactured capital), but are associated with higher spending 
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on education. Interestingly, PR systems that are thought to allow greater voice for small parties such as 
the Greens, do not seem to encourage lower CO2 production per economic unit produced.
17 Thus, the 
effect of a proportional electoral system on components of sustainability is mixed, but its overall effect 
is negative as the result reported in column 1 shows. Our results support those who argue that PR may 
encourage larger consumption (lower investment in manufactured capital) in general, but we also find 
that spending on education is higher among PR systems (Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 2003). As 
concerns the degree of government fractionalization, it has no statistically significant effect on the 
overall genuine savings rate. Higher fractionalization seems to discourage net national savings, but 
only marginally so. 
 
---------------------------Table 5 about here--------------------------------- 
 
We conducted several tests of sensitivity and checks for robustness. We add two variables 
strongly related to savings, but doing so reduces the sample of countries drastically. These variables 
are identified in the general savings literature as additional determinants of savings (Loayza et al. 
1998). First, we enter a term for the total money supply (M2) and secondly enter the age dependency 
ratio. Controlling for both variables, which are statistically significant in the models, the reported 
effects of democracy remain unaffected. We next test only a sub-sample consisting of developing 
countries by dropping 21 OECD countries from the complete sample (Western Europe, North 
America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand). The basic results on democracy remained unchanged. 
This suggests that the results are quite robust to sample size and specification. 
 
 
17 This result is somewhat at odds with Fredriksson and Millimet (2004b), but the dependent variables are 
different as they look at CO2 emission reduction, whereas our focus is on CO2 damage per unit of GNI. Clearly, 
the effect of democratic institutional variation on environmental outcomes deserves more of our attention, which 
we leave to future research. 
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Conclusion 
Democracy is ostensibly triumphant, but its benefits to society are questioned on many grounds 
(Shapiro and Hacker-Cordón 2002). In particular, there is little evidence that it aids economic 
development, a factor vital for underwriting the consolidation of recent democratic gains (Barro 1998; 
Mueller and Stratmann 2003). Others, however, show how democracy enhances future growth 
indirectly through human capital investment (Baum and Lake 2003; Lake and Baum 2001). The 
concept of sustainable development that values the preservation of resources and the environment for 
future generations moderates how one views immediate economic benefit, so that raising incomes is 
balanced with intergenerational equity and the quality of growth (Thomas et al. 2000). How then does 
democracy fare when one compares its performance over time for making the trade-offs required for 
raising current well-being without harming the future? To answer this question, we use the World 
Bank’s measure of genuine savings, which measures the rate of net investment in all forms of capital, 
including human and natural capital. Democracies are more sustainable than autocracies, even though 
they invest less in manufactured capital. It seems that democracies spend more on human capital 
accumulation, create less CO2
  damage, and deplete fewer resources per unit of economic output 
produced in the creation of wealth. Together these effects are strong enough to compensate for 
democracy’s negative effect on investment in manufactured capital such that democracies have higher 
overall genuine savings rates than autocracies. Our results thus confirm and yet qualify the effect of 
democracy found in existing studies. Yes, democracies spend more than autocracies and have thus 
lower investment in manufactured capital. However, at the same time, it matters on what public money 
is spent on and democracies spend more on productive purposes such as education. Democracies 
might not have a better economic performance in the short-term as measured by growth rates, but they 
are more protective of the long-term welfare of society. 
We also test various aspects of democratic institutional design on sustainability because of the 
implication that differing institutional rules shape outcomes among the democracies. Holding several 
variables constant, we find that parliamentary systems seem to be better than direct presidential ones 
when it comes to spending on education, but otherwise there is little difference between the two 
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systems. More importantly, there are no statistically significant differences among types of political 
system when it comes to the overall genuine savings rate, which is after all the only thing that matters 
in terms of weak sustainability. The type of electoral system, on the other hand, matters. PR electoral 
systems, which are associated with the so-called consensual types of governance, have worse records 
for investment in manufactured capital and the overall genuine savings rate, although they do spend 
more on education. This confirms existing studies, which suggest that PR systems spend more and 
invest less in manufactured capital (Roubini and Sachs; Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 1997, 2003). 
These results taken together reflect the complex nature of the trade-offs involved in economic 
policymaking that may determine the sustainability path of societies. They also put into doubt the 
proposition that the parliamentary-PR combination outperforms other systems (Crepaz 1998), at least 
with respect to achieving weak sustainability. 
Our main finding that democracy benefits sustainability is robust to a variety of specifications 
and holds for a sub-sample consisting of only developing countries. In conclusion, we find that 
democratic policymaking is associated with better prospects for sustainable development. Our results, 
like those of others, may suggest that the general pessimism toward the economic performance of 
democracies might be highly premature, as others too have suggested (Lake and Baum 2001). 
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Table 1: PCSE regressions of regime type on the genuine savings rate, 1975–2000 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Polity  0.16***      
  (0.04)      
Polity_dummy   1.77***    
   (0.57)    
Polyarchy    0.07**   
    (0.03)   
Freedom House     0.20** 
     (0.10) 
Ln  gni/pc  12.62*** 12.78*** 13.80*** 12.69*** 
  (4.78) (4.79) (4.91) (4.83) 
(Ln gni/pc)
2 -0.48* -0.48* -0.53* -0.46 
  (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.29) 
Econ.Growth  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Urban  pop.%  -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.21*** -0.20*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Ln  trade/gdp  2.30*** 2.31*** 2.30*** 2.31*** 
  (0.68) (0.68) (0.67) (0.67) 
Ln  pop.size  0.57** 0.61** 0.66** 0.65** 
  (0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28) 
Ln  pop.density  1.60*** 1.61*** 1.50*** 1.54*** 
  (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
Oil  dummy  -9.46*** -9.67*** -9.45*** -9.52*** 
  (1.45) (1.48) (1.45) (1.46) 
Civil  war  -0.93* -0.90* -0.91* -0.76 
  (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) 
Peace  years  0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Year  -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.29*** -0.28*** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Constant 490.33***  482.37*** 494.15*** 478.22***
  (143.84) (142.54) (143.18) (144.30) 
Observations  2564 2564 2563 2572 
No.  countries  129 129 129 129 
 
Absolute standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 2. PCSE regressions on components of genuine savings, 1975–2000 (Polity). 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Nns/gni  Educ/gni  CO dam/gni  2 Res.depl/gni 
Polity  -0.10*** 0.01**  -0.00**  -0.20*** 
  (0.04) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.04) 
Ln gni/pc  19.06***  0.00  2.00***  3.98 
 (4.05)  (0.59)  (0.34)  (3.40) 
(Ln gni/pc)
2 -0.94*** 0.03  -0.13***  -0.29 
 (0.24)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.21) 
Econ.Growth 0.03  -0.00 -0.00  0.01 
 (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02) 
Urban pop.%  -0.11***  0.01  0.01***  0.09** 
 (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.04) 
Ln trade/gdp  3.68***  0.26***  0.10*  1.09* 
 (0.64)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.58) 
Ln pop.size  1.40***  -0.12***  0.09***  0.46* 
 (0.27)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.26) 
Ln pop.density  0.72***  -0.27***  0.00  -1.26*** 
 (0.23)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.31) 
Oil dummy  4.16***  -0.18**  0.12***  9.56*** 
 (1.11)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (1.85) 
Civil war  -0.85**  0.02  -0.01  0.38 
 (0.42)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.37) 
Peace years  0.03**  0.00  -0.00**  -0.03* 
 (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02) 
Year -0.32***  -0.01  0.02***  -0.05 
 (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.10) 
Constant 522.71***  24.54  -55.79***  83.38 
 (120.39)  (15.18)  (10.48)  (194.94) 
Observations 2564  2564  2564  2564 
No. countries  129  129  129  129 
 
Absolute standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3. PCSE regressions on components of genuine savings, 1975–2000 (Polyarchy). 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Nns/gni  Educ/gni  CO dam/gni  2 Res.depl/gni 
Polyarchy  -0.11*** 0.01**  -0.00  -0.13*** 
  (0.03) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03) 
Ln gni/pc  16.83***  0.04  1.98***  1.58 
 (4.06)  (0.60)  (0.34)  (3.26) 
(Ln gni/pc)
2 -0.76*** 0.03  -0.13***  -0.12 
 (0.24)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.20) 
Econ.Growth 0.03  -0.00 -0.00  0.01 
 (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02) 
Urban pop.%  -0.12***  0.00  0.01***  0.10*** 
 (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.04) 
Ln  trade/gdp 3.78*** 0.27***  0.10*  1.24** 
 (0.65)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.58) 
Ln pop.size  1.48***  -0.11***  0.09***  0.48* 
 (0.27)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.25) 
Ln  pop.density 0.65***  -0.28*** -0.01  -1.24*** 
 (0.23)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.30) 
Oil dummy  4.07***  -0.18**  0.13***  9.96*** 
 (1.09)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (1.87) 
Civil war  -0.81*  0.03  -0.01  0.38 
 (0.42)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.38) 
Peace  years 0.04** 0.00  -0.00**  -0.03* 
 (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02) 
Year -0.34***  -0.01  0.02***  -0.07 
 (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.09) 
Constant 564.12***  25.68*  -54.16***  122.57 
  (120.37) (15.36) (10.10)  (183.37) 
Observations 2563  2563  2563  2563 
No. countries  129  129  129  129 
 
Absolute standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4. PCSE regressions on components of genuine savings, 1975–2000 (Freedom House). 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Nns/gni  Educ/gni  CO dam/gni  2 Res.depl/gni 
Freedom House  -0.30*** 0.02**  -0.01***  -0.35*** 
  (0.08) (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.10) 
Ln gni/pc  18.48***  -0.07  2.00***  3.72 
 (4.10)  (0.59)  (0.34)  (3.41) 
(Ln gni/pc)
2 -0.87*** 0.04  -0.13***  -0.26 
 (0.24)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.21) 
Econ.Growth 0.01  -0.00 -0.00  0.01 
 (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02) 
Urban pop.%  -0.13***  0.00  0.01***  0.09** 
 (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.04) 
Ln  trade/gdp 3.68*** 0.29***  0.10*  1.16** 
 (0.65)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.58) 
Ln pop.size  1.43***  -0.10***  0.09***  0.45* 
 (0.27)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.26) 
Ln  pop.density 0.64***  -0.28*** -0.00  -1.29*** 
 (0.23)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.32) 
Oil dummy  4.14***  -0.18**  0.13***  9.81*** 
 (1.13)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (1.88) 
Civil war  -0.69*  0.02  -0.01  0.37 
 (0.41)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.37) 
Peace years  0.05***  0.00  -0.00**  -0.02 
 (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02) 
Year -0.35***  -0.01  0.02***  -0.08 
 (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.09) 
Constant 590.67***  24.70*  -53.31***  148.21 
  (122.69) (14.66) (10.20)  (185.99) 
Observations 2572  2572  2572  2572 
No. countries  129  129  129  129 
 
Absolute standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5. Governmental fractionalization, political and electoral system and genuine savings. 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
 G.sav/gni  Nns/gni  Educ/gni  CO dam/gni  2 Res.dpl/gni 
Parliamentary  0.87 0.04  0.55***  0.02  -0.19 
  (0.73)  (0.73) (0.16) (0.04)  (0.47) 
President_assembly  -2.44 -1.97  0.15 0.25***  0.05 
  (1.58)  (1.39) (0.18) (0.10)  (0.51) 
PR electoral system  -1.62** -1.71**  0.36***  0.06  0.35 
  (0.68)  (0.70) (0.12) (0.07)  (0.36) 
Govt. fractional.  -0.40 -0.93*  0.04 -0.01  -0.56 
  (0.57)  (0.54) (0.07) (0.05)  (0.43) 
Ln gni/pc  29.51***  32.62***  -0.49  2.23***  -1.90 
  (8.21)  (6.63) (1.42) (0.40)  (5.93) 
(Ln gni/pc)
2 -1.41*** -1.75***  0.06  -0.14***  -0.01 
  (0.48)  (0.39) (0.08) (0.03)  (0.35) 
Econ.Growth 0.06  0.04  -0.00  -0.00  -0.01 
  (0.04)  (0.03) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.03) 
%urban pop.  -0.22***  -0.17***  0.01**  0.01***  0.06*** 
  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.02) 
Ln  trade/gdp  2.35*** 2.11** 0.25** 0.26***  0.30 
  (0.90)  (0.93) (0.13) (0.10)  (0.72) 
Ln pop.size  0.53*  1.20***  -0.16***  0.10***  0.50** 
  (0.28)  (0.31) (0.05) (0.03)  (0.23) 
Ln pop.density  0.08  0.10  -0.26***  0.02**  -0.31* 
  (0.26)  (0.29) (0.06) (0.01)  (0.17) 
Oil dummy  -8.64***  3.70***  -0.42**  0.13***  9.27*** 
  (1.80)  (1.43) (0.17) (0.05)  (2.05) 
Civil war  1.11  1.14  -0.03  -0.08***  0.08 
  (0.77)  (0.72) (0.07) (0.03)  (0.61) 
Peace years  0.06***  0.05**  0.00  -0.00***  0.00 
  (0.02)  (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.02) 
Year -0.20***  -0.22***  -0.02*  0.02***  -0.05 
  (0.08)  (0.06) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.06) 
Constant 255.06  272.20**  40.01*  -55.08***  113.88 
 (163.99)  (132.99)  (21.48)  (11.33)  (141.82) 
Observations  1197  1197 1197 1197  1197 
No of countries  88  88  88  88  88 
 
Absolute standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 




 N  Mean  Std.  Deviation  Min.  Max. 
Genuine savings  2572  6.6  12.3  -61.4  50.4 
Polity 2564  12.5  7.5  1  21 
Polyarchy 2563  13.2  13.4  0  47.1 
Freedom House  2572  8.5  3.9  2  14 
Pres. elected by assembly  1280  0.06  0.23  0  1 
Parliamentary 1280  0.57  0.50  0  1 
Proportional represent.  1228  0.50  0.50  0  1 
Govt. fractionalization  1226  0.25  0.28  0  1 
Income (log)  2572  8.0  1.1  5.4  10.4 
Economic growth  2572  1.2  5.3  -43.7  35.5 
Pop. Urban  2572  50.1  24.2  4  100 
Trade (log)  2572  4.1  0.6  1.8  6.1 
Population (log)  2572  16.1  1.5  12.8  20.9 
Pop. density (log)  2572  3.8  1.4  0.3  8.8 
Oil export dummy  2572  0.1  0.4  0  1 
Civil War  2572  0.2  0.4  0  1 
Peace Years   2572  20  16.5  0  54 
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Correlation matrix of variables: 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  11  12 
(1)  Gen.  Saving              
(2)  Polity  0.29             
(3)  Polyarchy  0.29  0.83            
(4) Freedom House  0.30  0.90  0.84                   
(5)  Income    0.26  0.58  0.70  0.65          
(6)  Growth  0.25  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.09         
(7)  Pop.  urban 0.04  0.45  0.59  0.53  0.82  0.02        
(8) Trade   0.11  0.01  0.08  0.05  0.20  0.06  0.18           
(9) Population.   0.02  0.10  0.08  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.05  -0.61         
(10) Pop. density   0.28  0.18  0.20  0.16  0.16  0.11  0.09  0.13  0.18       
(11) Oil export  -0.48  -0.21  -0.17  -0.16  0.04  -0.10  0.16  0.08  -0.01  -0.12     
(12)  Civil  War  -0.05 -0.02 -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 -0.04 -0.12 -0.26 0.28  0.13  -0.04  
(13) Peace Years   0.20  0.26  0.36 0.37 0.39 0.09 0.30 0.14 -0.12 -0.05 -0.05 -0.50 
 
Correlation matrix of institutional variables: 
 1  2  3 
(1) Pres. elected by assembly       
(2) Parliamentary  -0.27     
(3) Proportional representation  -0.00  -0.02   
(4) Govt. fractionalization  -0.11  0.10  0.22 
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